Nondisclosure Agreements : also called an NDA or a Confidentiality Agreement

•August 21, 2008 • Leave a Comment

Nondisclosure Agreements

www.nolo.com

A nondisclosure agreement — also called an NDA or a confidentiality agreement — is a contract in which the parties promise to protect the confidentiality of secret information that is disclosed during employment or another type of business transaction.

The use of nondisclosure agreements is widespread in the high-tech field, particularly for Internet and computer companies.

Example:

Sabeer Bhatia, founder of Hotmail, collected over 400 NDAs from employees, friends and roommates. He believes that his secrecy efforts gave him a crucial six-month lead on the competition. He eventually sold Hotmail to Microsoft for a reported $400 million in stock.

If you have a nondisclosure agreement with someone who uses your secret without authorization, you can ask that a court order the violator from making any further disclosures. You can also sue for damages.

Create a Confidential Relationship

The purpose of an NDA is to create a confidential relationship between the person who has a trade secret and the person to whom the secret is disclosed. People who have such a confidential relationship are legally bound to keep the information a secret.

An NDA is not the only way to create a confidential relationship. You can create a confidential relationship with an oral agreement or it can be implied from the conduct of the parties. However, these relationships are much more difficult to prove than a relationship based on a written agreement.

NDAs are often categorized as either “mutual” or “one-way.” A mutual NDA is one in which both parties are exchanging confidential information — for example, you provide secret information for a company to evaluate and they provide you with secret information about their marketing strategy. A one-way agreement is used when only one party is making a disclosure — for example, when you explain your secret to a contractor or investor.

Protect Trade Secrets

Use of a nondisclosure agreement is one of the best ways to protect trade secrets — that is, any information that is not generally known and gives your business a competitive advantage in the marketplace. For example, through a nondisclosure agreement, you can prohibit someone from disclosing a secret invention design, an idea for a new website, or confidential material contained in a copyrighted software program.

To learn more about the essentials of trade secret law, including what you can protect, see Nolo’s Trade Secret Basics FAQ.

Elements of a Nondisclosure Agreement

There are five important elements in a nondisclosure agreement:

definition of confidential information
exclusions from confidential information
obligations of receiving party
time periods, and
miscellaneous provisions.
Definition of Confidential Information

Every nondisclosure agreement provides a list of the types or categories of confidential information to be protected in the agreement. The purpose is to establish the boundaries, or subject matter, of the disclosure, without actually disclosing the secrets. For example, an NDA may state: Confidential information includes programming code, financial information, related software materials and innovative processes.

Exclusions From Confidential Information

Every nondisclosure agreement excludes some information from protection, meaning that the party that receives the excluded information has no obligation to protect it. These exceptions are based on established principles of law — the most important one being that information is not protected if it was created or discovered by the receiving party prior to (or independent of) any involvement with the disclosing party. For example, if another company develops an invention with similar trade secret information before being exposed to the disclosing party’s secrets, then that company is still free to use its independently created invention.

Obligations of the Receiving Party

The nondisclosure agreement will generally state that the receiving party must hold and maintain the information in confidence and limit its use. Under most state laws, the receiving party cannot breach the confidential relationship, induce others to breach it, or induce others to acquire the secret by improper means. Most businesses will accept these contract obligations without discussion.

Time Periods

Some agreements require that the receiving party maintain the secret information for a limited period of years. This is often done with language such as: The receiving party shall not use or disclose the secret for a period of five years from the date of execution of the agreement.

Parties often negotiate over the time period. Five years is common in American nondisclosure agreements, although many companies insist on only two or three years. In European nondisclosure agreements, it is not unusual for the period to be as long as ten years. Ultimately, the length used will depend on the relative bargaining power of the parties.

Trade Secrets Lawsuit Claims Against Microsoft To Proceed To Trial

•August 18, 2008 • Leave a Comment

February 12, 2008

Milord & Associates, by Milord A. Keshishian

A lawsuit alleging trade secret and copyright infringement litigation was filed by Symantec security products subsidiary against Microsoft in 2006: Veritas Operating Corporation v. Microsoft Corporation, Case No. 2:06-CV-00703-JCC (W.D. Washington). The case arose from a 1996 agreement between Symantec and Microsoft, whereby Symantec had shared its source code in certain software products for Microsoft to uses in its operating systems and server software. Symantec alleged that Microsoft breached their agreement by modifying the software in ways that were exclusively reserved to Symantec and expressly prohibited, thereby running afoul of Symantec’s trade secret rights and copyrights. Microsoft filed for summary judgment of non-infringement of Symantec’s alleged trade secrets, copyrights, and other claims.

On February 4, 2008, the Court denied most of Microsoft’s requests. The Court ruled that it was not persuaded that Microsoft did not breach its agreement and that Veritas had presented enough evidence to establish its trade secret rights in the private interfaces and other information. The Court also noted that Veritas had provided credible evidence of bad faith, one in the form of an email summarizing a statement by one of Microsoft’s managers on the project, who admitted that:

his intention is to eventually get [Symantec] out of the box because he believes we should not rely on any 3rd party for core components. . . . He also says he doesn’t care a damn about the contract because he wasn’t involved, and we should just lie to [Symantec] that we are doing this for performance reasons[.]

Also, because the Court found that whether or not Microsoft’s actions were within the scope of the Agreement is a fact question that remains for the jury, it maintained Symantec’s copyright infringement claim – finding substantial similarity in Microsoft’s software. Accordingly, Symantec’s remaining claims will now proceed to trial.

LimitNone Lawsuit Accuses Google of Trade Secret Theft

•August 18, 2008 • Leave a Comment
June 24, 2008 12:21 PM PDT

LimitNone, a small software development company, is seeking nearly $1 billion in damages in a lawsuit that accuses Google of reneging on a partnership with the small company and misappropriating its trade secrets for its Google Apps online service.

Specifically, the suit concerns LimitNone software called gMove designed to let people move e-mail, contacts, and calendar information stored in Microsoft Outlook to Google’s online service. Google initially helped LimitNone develop, promote, and sell the product, assuring LimitNone it wouldn’t offer a competing product, but then reversed course by giving away its own tool, Google E-mail Uploader, to premier-level Google Apps customers, the lawsuit said.

“With gMove priced at $19 per copy and Google’s prediction that there were potentially 50 million users, Google deprived LimitNone of a $950 million opportunity by offering Google’s competitive product for free as a part of its ‘premier’ Google Apps package,” the lawsuit, filed Monday in Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois.

Google didn’t immediately comment for this story.

LimitNone had shared confidential technical and sales forecast details with Google, the lawsuit said.

“Without Google’s knowledge and use of the gMove trade secrets and confidential information, Google would not have been able to solve its longstanding Microsoft Outlook to Gmail conversion problem,” the lawsuit said. “At a minimum, Google’s access to the internal workings of gMove allowed it to gain a significant head start on designing the inner workings for a competing application.”

Google’s product “copied gMove’s look, feel, functionality, and distribution model, including several unique and proprietary operations,” the suit said.

And in May 2008, Google changed its user interface, breaking gMove compatibility and forcing the company to provide customer refunds.

The complaint alleges Google misappropriated trade secrets from LimitNone and violated fraud law by inducing LimitNone to share confidential information Google used to develop its competing product.

Homeland Security Authorizes Laptop Searches At U.S. Borders : Comprimises Trade Secrets

•August 18, 2008 • Leave a Comment

The ruling lets border agents view travelers’ pictures, e-mail, and browser history without suspicion during on-the-spot inspections or in secondary locations.

By K.C. Jones
InformationWeek

August 5, 2008 06:23 PM
Investigators don’t have to suspect illegal activity in order to read people’s e-mail, examine their photographs, and find out what Web sites they have visited when they enter the United States with laptops or other electronic devices, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security said recently.

DHS outlined its policies on searching information contained in personal electronics last month. The release of information was in response to public interest in the matter. The courts recently upheld the federal government’s right to search laptops and other electronic devices to combat terrorism, child pornography, and other crime.

More Security Insights White PapersController Based Encryption A Process-based Approach to Protecting Privileged Accounts: An Introduction to Symark PowerKeeper WebcastsWeb 2.0: Business Opportunity or Security Threat?

Managing Risk and Bringing Rigor to Information Security ReportsRolling Review: Microsoft NAP Can Passive Radio Eavesdroppers Listen In On Your Company? Border agents can examine the contents of laptops and other devices of citizens and foreigners entering the United States, without suspicion of criminal wrongdoing — as long as they return them in a reasonable amount of time, according to DHS and the courts. The government and the courts have not defined what constitutes reasonable.

Critics contend that the practice is a violation of privacy and that it compromises trade secrets and other sensitive information contained in the laptops of traveling professionals.

DHS said the information or copies of it can be examined on or off site, but it can only be retained if investigators have reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity or if the information relates to immigration matters.

The policy states that border agents must treat business or commercial information as confidential and “take all reasonable measures to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure.” The document states that some information may be protected by the Trade Secrets Act and other privacy laws.

DHS also said that some information may be covered by attorney-client privilege. The policy is vague about the privilege and states that such information isn’t necessarily exempt from searches but may require “special handling procedures.” It advises agents to seek advice from top legal counsel if a document may “constitute evidence of a crime or otherwise pertain to a determination within the jurisdiction” of custom agents.

The DHS document does not address medical issues and documents, which generally fall under stricter privacy protections than other information.

U.S. Sen. Russell Feingold, D-Wis., said he plans to introduce legislation limiting such searches.

Editor’s Note: This story was updated on Aug. 6 to more accurately describe DHS’ policy on retaining information from laptops.

How to Keep Corporate Secrets a Secret

•August 17, 2008 • Leave a Comment

 

By H. Abelson, K. Ledeen, H. Lewis, E-Week.com

One of the problems with corporate data breaches is the catastrophic risk to corporations when trade secrets, customer lists, pricing data and other critical information are exposed. Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen and Harry Lewis, authors of “Blown to Bits: Your Life, Liberty, and Happiness after the Digital Explosion,” explain how companies can use the right mix of process, people and advanced technologies to keep their data secure—and their CIOs out of the headlines.

There is nothing like a data breach to bring a CIO unwanted publicity. We read all the time about these costly spills of precious corporate data, from the British government exposing the records of 25 million citizens, to the TJX Companies’ loss of 45.6 million credit card and debit card records. The PRC (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) documented roughly 234 million data records were involved in security breaches since 2005.

The cases involve everything—from the University of Iowa putting a few hundred students’ data on the Internet—to the supermarket chain Hannaford Bros.’ breach, in which 4.2 million credit card numbers were compromised and more than 1,800 cases of identity theft resulted. Tapes lost, laptops stolen, Wi-Fi and network snooping, malware and virus intrusions, and plain old theft are just a few of the threats that keep CIOs up at night.

The problem of data leaks goes far beyond the breaches that make the news. Potentially more catastrophic than the exposure of personal data is the risk to corporations when trade secrets, customer lists, pricing data and other critical assets leak out the door. Keeping corporate secrets a secret requires careful thought, effective processes and sophisticated technology.

Most of the efforts at data leak prevention focus on making systems and networks secure. These steps are essential. However, as the volume of digital data grows, protecting systems may not be enough. Intelligence services have always known to protect the message, not just the medium. A courier can be kidnapped even if he is surrounded by spear carriers, but his message will be safe if the enemy can’t read it.

Fire walls, anti-virus software and password-controlled access are all forms of “perimeter protection.” With so many places for data to be stored and so many ways for it to move off the premises (for example, laptops with 200GB disk drives, iPods and cell phones capable of carrying tens of gigabytes of data—not to mention the Internet), perimeter protection may not suffice to meet every threat.

Companies maintain rigorous perimeter protection in a number of ways: by disabling USB ports to prevent the use of memory sticks, by blocking access to Web-based e-mail, and even by monitoring data flows. But, no matter how diligently applied, these approaches leave the data itself unprotected. Once secret data slips out the door, all the fire walls in the world can’t get it back—protecting the data is key.

A complete solution combines process and people with advanced technologies. Here are five steps to consider:

Step No. 1: Identify the data that needs protecting.

If you try to protect everything, life will be too difficult. Users will be annoyed and they will undermine the process. Be reasonable and employees will participate. The classification process needs to be thorough, comprehensive and participatory. Segregating valuable data is an important first step and there are tools that can help.

Step No. 2: Secure the message as well as the medium.

Even with SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) and VPN, strong passwords, fire walls and a flood of security patches, the medium (the network and the attached servers) should be considered inherently insecure. The greatest security comes from protecting the data itself. Even a gargantuan data breach will be of no real consequence if the data is undecipherable.

Sensitive data should be encrypted, and a business process surrounding key management should be in place to restrict access in a manner consistent with corporate data access policies.

Encryption has been around ever since Julius Caesar coded his messages by shifting the alphabet. Data encryption tools are now integrated well with standard office software. Yet, many organizations don’t bother with even the most basic data protection practices, such as applying passwords to Word and Excel files, or using the native Windows hard disk encryption capabilities for laptops that leave the office.

The widespread use of encryption and digital rights management has greatly complicated corporate key management practices. If you are not familiar with the Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure initiative, now would be a good time to check it out at www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=ekmi.

Step No. 3: Address issues for all three data states, and implement processes and technologies for each: data at rest, data in motion and data in use. 

It’s easy to focus too much attention in one or two areas. For example, to manage data at rest, find all the critical data sources, identify how they are stored and protected and consider encrypted databases and files. To manage data in motion, use signed and encrypted e-mail, SSL connections, VPN and other forms of network protection. Remember, the bulk of data breaches are unintentional. They have become more common because increasing numbers of workers carry more and more data with them.

Step No. 4: Consider signing documents and files.

Digital signatures not only make it possible to protect data through strong encryption, but they also provide a means to validate the source, and ensure that nothing has been changed. Like key management, digital signatures require that certificates be issued and identities verified. Microsoft Outlook, for example, supports signing and encrypting with digital certificates. It even provides links to certificate authorities (the folks who issue digital certificates) that will sell you personal and corporate certificates.

Step No. 5: Investigate the latest generation of data leak prevention (DLP) tools.

There are many companies that provide DLP tools to discover, classify and protect your data. Among them are companies such as Iron Mountain, Websense, Reconnex, RSA Security, Trend Micro and Essential Security Software.

The rate of data breaches is unlikely to slow, and its seriousness will not diminish. This is the case for the simple reason that the data driving modern enterprises is becoming increasingly accessible and transportable. However, the right tools and technologies do exist to help keep corporate secrets secret—and CIOs out of the headlines.

Harry Lewis (on the left) is professor of computer science at Harvard and fellow of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. He can be reached at lewis@harvard.edu . Ken Ledeen (in the middle) is chairman and CEO of Nevo Technologies. He can be reached at kledeen@nevo.com. Hal Abelson (on the right) is professor of computer science and engineering at MIT. He can be reached at hal@mit.edu.

Man Charged with Stealing Trade Secrets from Andover Firm

•August 17, 2008 • Leave a Comment

 

The Eagle Tribune,  By Mark E. Vogler and Jim Patten
Staff Writers

Published: July 24, 2008 12:10 am
ANDOVER — Police have charged an employee of a local job placement agency with stealing client information and giving it to a former co-worker who was fired earlier this year over similar allegations.

Timothy Corcoran, a veteran worker at Staffing Group/Andover Personnel, is accused of stealing possible job leads, resumes and other classified information and giving it to Henry Jacobo at Brooks Staffing & Associates — a North Andover company he helped set up last December before being fired from Staffing Group.

Corcoran, 46, of 168 River Road, Andover, was charged with buying, selling or receiving stolen trade secrets, and conspiracy. After his arraignment yesterday in Lawrence District Court, Corcoran was released without bail and ordered to return to court on Sept. 9 for a pretrial hearing.

Jacobo, 30, of Methuen has not been formally charged. But the police report filed with the court in connection with Corcoran’s arrest name him as a major focus of an investigation that dates back to May. The document mentioned that he was to be arraigned in Lawrence District Court on two counts of grand larceny resulting from the theft of confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets.

Lt. James Hashem would not identify the worker Staffing Group fired earlier this year after conducting an internal investigation. But it’s clear from the court documents that Corcoran’s arrest was based on the company’s ongoing investigation after Jacobo was fired.

Andover detectives David Milne and Patrick Keefe went to the company at 35 New England Business Park on Tuesday to talk to Corcoran, who accompanied them to the police station, where he was arrested after an interview.

Corcoran told police that Jacobo was stealing information to use in creating his own company, Brooks Staffing, according to the court document. Corcoran said he warned Jacobo that it was risky to send information he took from the company over his office computer to his personal e-mail account — and that he would eventually get caught doing it.

When detectives pressed Corcoran to explain his relationship with Jacobo, he told them he agreed to provide information to Jacobo — knowing that the information he was sending was protected and prohibited for use outside the company — because he was having financial troubles and needed the money, police said.

If convicted, Corcoran faces up to five years in prison, or two years in the house of correction and a $500 fine.

Staffing Group describes itself as a staffing and placement firm that recruits and places job candidates in temporary, permanent and contract to hire positions at all skill levels. Such companies are frequently referred to as “headhunters.”

Company officials told police the firm has generated confidential information about its business clients and job candidates, which is stored on a database at the company that is only accessible by selected employees.

The information is considered confidential and the company goes to great lengths to secure it, according to reports.

Company officials told police Jacobo admitted he used protected information obtained by the company for personal use and to profit from it, through his own company, Brooks Staffing.

The company decided to continue its investigation after Jacobo’s firing, monitoring other company workers who had close relationships with him and that is when Corcoran’s involvement was uncovered.

Company officials described Corcoran, an employee since February 2000, as “a high level employee with a large salary and benefit package,” who also had unlimited access to the company’s confidential and proprietary information as well as password access to the company’s computer search engines.

According to police reports filed in the case, company officials were shocked at learning that Jacobo would continue to steal information from the company, even after being terminated, by seeking Corcoran’s assistance.

Corcoran admitted to police he e-mailed a copy of a job description and the names of three potential clients that met the job requirements, reports said.

He told police he was to be paid 60 percent of the fee the fired man’s company earned from placing the clients.

The clients were never placed and he was never paid, Corcoran told police.

He told police after he had sent the three names to the fired employee, he did not send any more.

Neither Corcoran nor Jacobo could be reached for comment. They did not return telephone calls left at their homes.

A company spokesman did not return calls for comment for this story. Andover attorney Ted Craney, who was retained by the company to investigate allegations about the two employees, also did not return telephone calls left at his office.

Brooks Staffing & Associates, is a limited liability company with offices at 800 Turnpike St. in North Andover. Christopher Driscoll is listed as the manager and resident agent.

Jacobo and the company are defendants in a lawsuit filed earlier this year by Staffing Group in Suffolk Superior Court.

“The Staffing Group claims that Jacobo violated his non-competition agreement, breached his fiduciary duties to the Andover company and misappropriated trade secrets when he and Driscoll started their competing business while Jacobo was still employed as a manager at the company where he worked for eight years and made more than $100,000 annually, according to court documents,” The Boston Business Journal reported several months ago.

United States: Protecting Client Information Via Federal Rule 26(c)

•August 17, 2008 • Leave a Comment

 

15 August 2008

Miller & Martin, PLLC
by T. Harold Pinkley and Charlnette A. Richard

Businesses dislike litigation. There are a number of reasons for this, such as cost, risk of loss, and disruption of normal business operations. Less often noted, but just as important, is the risk of revealing important confidential or proprietary business information. Such information can include not only trade secrets but also customer lists, pricing, and other business-related information that clients would very much like to keep away from competitors, regardless of whether they are adversaries in litigation. Once protected information is out of the bag, for all practical purposes it has become public knowledge.

How can trial attorneys help our clients protect sensitive information during both pre-trial discovery and the introduction of evidence at trial? As always, it is a good idea to start with the rules. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)1 gives us a way to prevent the release of confidential and privileged information. Whether you are a plaintiffs’ attorney in a personal-injury lawsuit trying to limit the release of confidential psychiatric records or a defense attorney in a products-liability case shielding sensitive trade secrets, Federal Rule 26(c) provides effective privacy safeguards.2

Advance Preparation

Always take steps to protect confidential information before an emergency arises in a deposition or at trial. The time to take action is during discovery and, preferably, before any sensitive information has been disclosed. For example, suppose you’re defending a deponent who happens to be a chief new-product design engineer, and she’s being interrogated about potential new products by a lawyer for your client’s prime competitor; if you haven’t already laid the groundwork for Rule 26(c) protection, you’ve waited too long. In such event, you may have to resort to the awkward procedure of Rule 30(d)(3) (formerly 30(d)(4)) which requires that you suspend the deposition and seek a court order limiting the scope of questioning. This procedure is uncertain, time-wasting and potentially much more costly than addressing the issue ahead of time.

Order Of Protection

An order of protection entered in advance is an excellent tool for preventing or remedying unwanted disclosures during depositions and the inappropriate introduction of testimony or exhibits at trial. Under Rule 26(c), the trial court has the authority to seal, limit or prohibit pre-trial discovery to protect a “trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information.”3 A balancing approach is used to reconcile the interests of the party seeking information, the public’s right to access information, and the interests of the party desiring to protect information.

Obtaining an order of protection pursuant to Rule 26(c) is a multistep process. The party requesting protection must first make a good-faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute with opposing counsel. If this effort is unsuccessful, the party needing protection should file a motion explaining why good cause exists for obtaining an order, which is subject to a strict standard.4

To prove good cause, one must demonstrate actual or potential harm. As one court has stated, “[B]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning,” are not sufficient to establish good cause.5 “[T]he district court should consider whether the case involves issues important to the public. If the matter involves issues or parties of a public nature, and involves matters of legitimate public concern, this should be a factor weighing against entering or maintaining an order of confidentiality.”6 However, if the court finds that the “case involves private litigants, and concerns matters of little legitimate public interest,” good cause will likely be found.7

If the party seeking the protective order succeeds in showing good cause, the burden then shifts to the requesting party to show that the information is relevant and necessary.8 Some courts have held that this burden is subject to even stricter scrutiny than the burden for obtaining an order.9 If the requesting party fails to satisfy its burden, the discovery request is generally denied.10 However, if the requesting party is able to satisfy its burden, the court must then “weigh the potential injury from disclosure against the moving party’s need for the information.”11 Regarding this higher standard, one federal district court has explained:

[O]nce the privilege is asserted by the owner, the party seeking discovery must make a clear showing that the documents are relevant to the issues involved in the litigation. In doubtful situations, production will not be ordered. The court is aware that this standard is higher than the hurdle for discovery of unprivileged but relevant documents but this court considers such a higher standard necessary in order to guard against the possible use of doubtfully relevant trade secrets by the opposing parties for their own business ends.12

If the court determines it can sufficiently protect the trade secret or other confidential information, the court should issue a protective order which incorporates the interests of both parties.13 If, on the other hand, the court determines that a protective order cannot sufficiently protect the trade secret, the court may deny the request for information.14 The protective order should remain effective throughout subsequent litigation, including trial, and can be used to object to the attempted introduction of evidence that falls under the scope of the protection.

Protecting trade secrets and other proprietary information is an important and long-standing practice recognized the highest court of the land.15 “Federal law and the substantive law in every state recognize the importance of providing strong legal protection for trade secrets.”16 It is important for both sides to put forth their very best arguments and evidence at the trial court level in favor of or against protective orders, for it is difficult to obtain reversal on appeal;17 the burden falls on the appellant to show the trial court’s abuse of discretion.18

Modification Of Protective Orders

Are protective orders permanent? What happens if someone wants to lift or modify the order down the road? Is this possible? The answer is that orders of protection are not necessarily permanent and are subject to being lifted or modified. Only the trial court, however, has the authority to lift or to modify its previous order.19 It is paramount for the trial court to provide a detailed explanation of its decision.20

The federal Courts of Appeal, however, differ on the standard used for determining whether to modify an existing order.21 The Second and Sixth circuits typically use a strict approach, which does “not allow modification absent a showing of improvidence in the grant of the initial protective order, or some extraordinary circumstance, or some compelling need.”22

Most circuits, however, reject this strict standard. Instead, most circuits have adopted the method used by the Third Circuit, which mirrors the balancing test used to determine whether a protective order should be granted in the first instance, while also considering the original parties’ reliance on the protective order since it was initially granted. The objective is to determine whether good cause exists for maintaining the order.23 In making this determination, the court will consider whether allowing access to protected materials can be granted without causing harm to legitimate privacy interests; if so, access should be granted. Unless the motion seeks to modify a blanket protective order, the movant has the burden of establishing that the need for access to the materials outweighs the privacy concerns. When modification of a blanket protective order is sought, the party seeking to maintain the confidentiality must designate the documents alleged to be confidential and then establish that good cause exists with respect to those documents.24

In sum, Rule 26(c) protects the rights of litigants who have a legitimate reason for maintaining privacy both throughout the discovery process and at trial. Its purpose can be summarized in one sentence: “[l]itigants do not give up their privacy rights simply because they have walked, voluntarily or involuntarily, through the courthouse door.”25

Footnotes

1. As amended December 1, 2007. According to the Advisory Committee Notes for the 2007 Amendment, “the language of Rule 26 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.”

2. Most states have enacted similar rules. See Francis H. Hare, Jr., James L. Gilbert & William H. Remine, Confidentiality Orders (1988) § 7.17, at 238 n.11.

3. All references to Rule 26 are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

4. Rule 26©.

5. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3rd Cir. 1986).

6. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3rd Cir. 1994).

7. Id.

8. In re Remington Arms Co., 952 F.2d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir 1991); see also Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

9. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1185 (D.S.C. 1975).

10. Centurion Indus. V. Warren Steurer, 665 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir. 1981).

11. Hartman v. Remington Arms Co. Inc., 143 F.R.D. 673, 674 (W.D. Mo. 1992).

12. Duplan Corp., 397 F.Supp. at 1185.

13. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1984).

14. Hartman, 143 F.R.D. at 675.

15. See, e.g., Carpenter v United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).

16. Arthur R. Miller, “Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,” 105 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 472 (1991).

17. See, Pansy, supra, at 783; Am. Standard, Inc., supra, at 743; Rachels v. Steele, 633 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

18. Rachels, 633 S.W.2d at 475.

19. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993); Beckman Indus., Inc. v Int’l. Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1992); United Nuclear Corp. v . Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990).

20. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 789.

21. See Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 659 (Tenn. 1996).

22. See, e.g., Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 864–66 (2nd Cir. 1985); United States v Kentucky Utils. Co., 927 F.2d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1991). But see Meyer Goldberg, Inc. of Lorain v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 823 F.2d 159, 163–64 (6th Cir. 1987).

23. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790.

24. Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 660 (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790).

25. Miller, 105 Harv. L. Rev. at 466.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

 
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